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ABSTRACT
Established retailers are facing growing competitive pressure from pure internet startups that are leveraging eCommerce
marketplaces hosted by Amazon, Facebook, Alibaba, eBay, etc. Some traditional retailers, such as Best Buy, Macy’s, and Walmart,
have created an effective competitive response to these pure eCommerce startups by adapting their customer experience and
effectively integrating their physical infrastructure with their online presence and making online shopping easier than ever for
consumers. GlobePort, a nationwide sporting goods retailer with 200+ locations, $1+ billion in annual revenues, and $100+ million
in profits, recognized this trend and established an eCommerce site using an outsourced IT provider. Despite having the flexibility
of their brick-and-mortar stores for in-person sales/service and the internet site for eCommerce sales, GlobePort is facing
profitability issues from their internet sales channel as a result of poor support from their IT provider. Their problems are further
compounded by incomplete customer information and the lack of strategic integration between their physical and internet channels.
Recently, GlobePort executives have come to recognize that their internet sales are lagging industry norms and have begun to take
steps to improve their eCommerce systems. However, any systems changes would require additional in-house IT staff with new
skillsets and necessitate close teamwork throughout their widespread organization. More importantly, a technology transformation
project would lead to new and redesigned customer-facing and operational business processes and the collection and integration of
customer data/knowledge across their traditional organizational silos.
Keywords: Emerging technologies, Architecture, E-commerce, Change management, Knowledge management (KM), Strategic
alignment & deployment
1. CASE SUMMARY
GlobePort was locked into a 10-year hosting contract with an
eBay subsidiary that managed their online eCommerce
platform. Although the site had been up and running for over
five years, GolobePort’s board of directors saw the potential for
more internet sales revenue and profits than what their current
eCommerce site was delivering. The board was also aware of
the transformations that GlobePort’s competitors were
implementing to adopt an omni-channel retail strategy, where
physical stores, internet sites, and mobile apps worked
seamlessly (Josevski et. al., 2019). There were also many
ongoing issues stemming from the outsourcing of their
eCommerce platform. It took GlobePort several days to make
fairly simple changes to the internet site, and communicating
with the eBay subsidiary was very difficult. Multiple parties
would need to get involved to make routine changes, such as
implementing a marketing campaign or even a product pricing
change. A simple price change would take a minimum of 24
hours to show up on their website, which did not allow for quick
reaction to market events. As an example, one Black Friday, a

pair of boots was mistakenly priced at $0.01. The site sold out
of 5,000 pairs resulting in a loss of $45,000 and a potential
revenue loss of $250,000. This was unacceptable to senior
management of GlobePort. The board also questioned the lack
of profitability on the eCommerce side of their business and the
poor merchandise management across the internet and physical
channels. It was evident to the board that GlobePort needed to
adapt its operational processes and integrate internet and
physical channels in order to transform their customer
experience like other retailers.
2. INTRODUCTION
The popular omni-channel integration model represents the
enablement of customers to shop across physical, mobile, and
social media so that information and consumer decision-making
steps can progress from one to another media seamlessly
(Brynjolfossen, Hu, and Rahman, 2013). This approach allows
personalized interactions between the retailer and the individual
customer and the convenience of not encountering device
and/or physical barriers as customers move from one media to
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another. Board members also felt that GlobePort’s currently
outsourced eCommerce technology architecture and IT
processes would pose a serious hindrance to GlobePort if they
proposed to implement an omni-channel business strategy to
deliver new seamless and integrated customer experiences.
GlobePort’s eCommerce hosting contract with the eBay
subsidiary had been in effect for over half a decade. However,
in the last two years, eBay had branched out and now had
several different companies that offered the same type of
products as GlobePort. GlobePort had never established a
contract clause that would restrict eBay from offering similar
products from competing companies, such as the pure online
retailers, who relied on selling “generic” products at the lowest
price. As eBay brought more and more such resellers on board,
when a purchase was made, the product was sold based on
availability, price, and shipping costs. Essentially GlobePort
now had only a 10% chance (1 of 10 companies currently
selling similar products through the eBay eCommerce site) of
completing the transaction in any search scenario.
Moreover, GlobePort’s current eCommerce platform had
several functional deficiencies. Some major retailers, such as
Best Buy, allowed customers to open an interactive chat as they
browsed their internet site to get product questions answered.
But there was no way for GlobePort to interactively engage
with the customer using the eBay platform and provide
additional information to differentiate their superior products
and services. Moreover, GlobePort’s customers were using a
variety of devices, such as smartphones and tablets, to access
the internet site, to research products, and to collect information
before placing orders. Mining this knowledge about how, why,
and when customers used various devices to shop online could
also help shape GlobePort’s response and offers to their
customers (Zhang et. al., 2010). But due to the outsourcing
contract, GlobePort was also not able to collect detailed
information about their customer’s online behaviors and then
use analytics to track and engage these customers using the
traffic data from their eBay site. eBay always sought the
expansion of their platform using the spread approach
(“tipping”) by bundling and tying technical features to the
acquisition of adjacent market share and limiting
customizations (Gawer and Cusumano, 2008). This hindered
GlobePort’s ability to create personalized experiences and
customized offers for their customers (McLean, Al-Nabhani,
and Wilson, 2018). Even after the customer’s search session
had ended, retailers like Macy’s were able to continue to engage
their customers through iPhone/Android store apps with
reminders and information on the products that they had
searched. This type of customer engagement was particularly
important as GlobePort’s most profitable products are “niche”
and had features that needed to be experienced. Without these
interactions, GlobePort was resigned to competing on a
“commodity” basis with other pure online retailers.
3. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
GlobePort has always based its brand on not being the lowest
priced provider, but rather offering more innovative products
paired with reliable customer service. “We cover a majority of
the shipping costs, and we have a no-questions-asked process
of making any situation right and an upfront return policy.

There is no way to provide the customer experience that we
want to deliver with the eBay platform,” thought Joe Miller,
CEO of GlobePort.
GlobePort was increasingly competing with digitally native
stores who create value by being nimble and eschewing the long
term value proposition. So first-time, price-conscious
customers were not able to understand the value of GlobePort’s
excellent customer service. When making a purchase, most
consumers were going with the vendor that gave them the
lowest cost per item. This left GlobePort with reduced sales
from competing with these “pure digital” companies who were
eroding their own profits to gain a sale.
As Joe Miller stated, “We will not engage in a price war to
increase sales. We will continue to win over customers because
of our excellent customer service and speed to market with
product innovations.” A perfect example recently happened
where a competing company went into bankruptcy after
offering deep discounts on a variety of eCommerce
marketplaces (Ewen, 2016). They did this to gain new
customers with the wrong assumption that they would gain
some sort of customer loyalty with only a low price offer and
without any need for branding or building a customer
experience (Williams, 2016). Unfortunately, most customers
are only loyal to the lowest price, and they moved on to the next
vendor when the discounts were no longer being offered. The
vendors competed away their entire profit margin in a futile
attempt to gain business without also making necessary
investments into improving key internal processes such as more
efficient order fulfillment (Skolnik, 2001).
eBay also controlled what items were listed on their website
and included many items that GlobePort did not carry in their
brick and mortar stores. Items such as stuffed animals and
hardware tools would be shown on the same screen, and this
was diluting the GlobePort brand image. GlobePort began to
see that the eCommerce sales were also cannibalizing brickand-mortar sales from their physical stores, and their IT
middleman, eBay, was profiting from this transformation.
GlobePort’s board of directors knew it was time for a change.
They realized that their customers wanted to use a variety of
devices to interact, communicate, and purchase from them.
Present-day customers increasingly use different types of
devices and different apps or touchpoints on those devices
based on their situational characteristics, such as their location,
their present state of mobility, and their physical and/or social
surroundings. Smartphones and apps are used when time is
critical or in a period of time that would otherwise go unused,
whereas at the office, a computer web browser touchpoint was
preferred and popular (Wang, Malthouse, and Krishnamurthi,
2015). Moreover, for partner-owned transaction touchpoints
(e.g., a Google search), customer-owned touchpoints (e.g., a
customer’s own product review blog), and social/external
touchpoints (e.g., a product review on Yelp or TripAdvisor), the
retailer was not even able to control the customer’s experience,
such as the usability or certain features of a mobile app
(Wagner, Schramm-Klein and Steinmann, 2017).
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Figure 1. U.S. Online and Mail-Order Sales of Sporting Goods, 2004-2015
Halfway through their 10-year outsourcing contract,
GlobePort’s board decided to break their eCommerce
agreement with eBay and pay a $35 million fine (based on
forfeiture of site hosting discounts and commissions on
projected transactions that eBay would not earn over the next
4+ years) so they could bring their eCommerce platform inhouse and get better control. However, Joe Miller did not feel
comfortable bringing the platform in-house from the beginning.
He had been in the retail industry for 30 years but had very
limited technology experience. He had been pressured by the
board of directors to make a change due to the stagnation of
their eCommerce business and declining sales for the last
several years despite the overall growth in the sporting goods
retail industry. In the last board meeting, one of the directors
brought in sales figures from a sporting goods retail competitor.
The competitor was earning 20% of their sales from
eCommerce and 5% from mobile site sales, compared to the 8%
and 2%, respectively, for GlobePort. On average, other retailers
were earning 18% of their net revenues from the eCommerce
channel. The board members were all presented the chart in
Figure 1 which demonstrated that the sporting goods industry is
growing, especially in the eCommerce channel. It was evident

that GlobePort was not keeping up with competitors and was
losing its customer base. GlobePort’s 40% profit margin was
much higher for eCommerce sales compared to 15% for their
brick-and-mortar sales. GlobePort’s board was convinced that
a 10% year-over-year sales growth in the eCommerce channel
was possible without cannibalizing brick-and-mortar sales.
That would allow GlobePort to target 14% revenues from
eCommerce in 5 years.
At the strong urging of the board, Joe Miller agreed to
tackle their eCommerce site problems. He knew that eBay
would press for stiffer terms if they tried to renegotiate the
contract midstream. Achieving significant growth in
eCommerce sales revenue and quickly moving into a new omnichannel business model would also be very difficult if they
continued with eBay. The best option was bringing the platform
in-house and reorganizing their IT department to manage the
website, pricing, inventory, and integration with brick-andmortar stores and other business partners. Miller thought it
would be best to run everything under their CIO, Cory Williams
(Figure 2).
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Figure 2. GlobePort Company Organization Chart
3.1 Technology and Methodology Challenges
Cory Williams knew that recruiting and adding 20-25 new staff
to his IT department with advanced skillsets to design, develop,
and support their new eCommerce technology platform would
not be easy. GlobePort’s business displayed seasonal
fluctuations, regional spikes, multiple inventory zones, and
wide variation in product and supplier mix by each brick-andmortar location. He was certain that the eCommerce site would
need to be on a cloud platform, such as Azure or AWS (Amazon
Cloud), so that computing capacity could be dynamically
administered. Site update cycles needed to be shortened by
adopting continuous software development and deployment
methodologies (O’Connor, Elger, and Clarke, 2017). Finding
IT talent who understood modern IT architectures and
GlobePort’s business model and could also work with cloud
technology was not trivial. He looked for potential employees
who had previous experience hosting a website and started to
assemble IT skillsets.
Williams knew that there was no way that he could build
and support an eCommerce infrastructure from scratch with a
relatively small internal IT development team. Cory had learned
about the possibility of leveraging software services, such as
customer login authentication, third party product databases,
credit checking, and financial functions, already available on
the internet using server-less IT architectures that incorporate
third-party services. “Backend as a Service” (BaaS) IT
architecture is all about running backend code on the client side
and not building and managing monolithic servers internally

(Fowler, 2020). In this type of architecture, GlobePort could
still deploy any custom code via “managed containers” that
would run seamlessly on diverse computing devices (servers or
otherwise) and operating systems, thus making their platform
device agnostic. Adopting this model of IT architecture would
allow the distribution of some of the eCommerce technology
development work to GlobePort’s business partners and cloud
service providers and enable its business partners to develop
and deploy event driven software to automatically respond to
online events from their customers. For example, if a customer
posted a product comment in any online forum, the new
architecture would detect and generate an alert for an
instantaneous response.
Cory knew that server-less architectures would allow
GlobePort to run their eCommerce site with significantly
reduced long-term operational cost, complexity, and
engineering lead time, but at a cost of increased reliance on
vendor dependencies and comparatively immature support
services. A full BaaS architectural implementation would have
no server to maintain, all custom code would be executed in the
clients, and it would perform operations more quickly on
mobile devices. But drawbacks exist for full BaaS architectures,
such as security breaches and difficult orchestration challenges,
and a mitigation of both of these is possible with FaaS (Function
as a Service) or some other kind of lightweight server-side
component to move sensitive logic back onto an internal server.
Using a FaaS scheme, GlobePort could have better control of
their custom code and still avoid the high costs of maintaining
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“always on” servers. Cory estimated that designing,
developing, and deploying the new IT architecture and their
initial eCommerce site would be a 30-headcount project over
15-18 months. The price tag would be approaching $20 million
dollars with internal staff, equipment, consulting, and training
of their business partners (e.g., retail stores and suppliers).
Operating the site on AWS or Azure would cost another $5
million a year based on projected customer transaction volumes
in addition to the salaries of the two dozen IT staffers that would
be added to their eCommerce IT department.
3.2 IT and Business Policy Issues
Joe Miller held a company-wide conference in January,
announcing the start of the project to move their eCommerce
site in-house, their new organization chart (Figure 2), and the
impending business transformations to follow. The goal was to
have a functioning, in-house eCommerce site up and running
before the summer buying season. However, neither Joe Miller
nor Cory Williams initially addressed how this transformation
supported their overall organizational strategy. The brick-andmortar store managers had many questions which remained
unanswered from the kickoff meeting:
How would the new expansion in eCommerce play
alongside their brick-and-mortar strategy? Who would
decide what was promoted on the website and how
would they still be able to maintain their product mix
for their local markets? How would the fulfillment of
online orders come out of their store’s product
inventory and be delivered by the brick-and-mortars?
How would all this figure into their internal
merchandising operational processes?
The bigger questions (about the new eCommerce platform)
came from GlobePort’s business partners – their suppliers and
product development houses. They were completely shut-off
from any direct access to market/customer data and the
potential for launching market experiments and data gathering
using the eBay platform. The dynamic sporting goods industry
demanded that GlobePort’s suppliers and manufacturers be
given a secure means of engaging with GlobePort’s vast
customer base to create trial releases, test product innovations,
and get early access to local markets using the new eCommerce
platform. Cory Williams mentioned the development of an API
(application programming interface) gateway so that
applications (mobile or otherwise) developed by business
partners can securely access GlobePort’s digital resources, such
as data sets about customer history, market performance, trends,
and reviews. The business partners saw this as a much needed

platform enhancement that only a well-established sporting
goods retailer, such as GlobePort, could provide to them.
Over the next four months, the IT development and the
content teams worked on porting the website platform in-house
and taking over from eBay. One of GlobePort’s existing
warehouses was turned into a specific eCommerce fulfillment
center in April. The new warehouse would begin to store and
fulfill additional inventory. However, other business
transformation items remained unaddressed just as the
spring/summer buying season was ramping up for seasonal
goods. Traditionally, the buyers were given a brick-and-mortar
budget that they could spend on their department’s goods. The
buyers would plan the season’s purchases working with
inventory management and planning. This information would
then be approved by the general merchandise managers and
disseminated to marketing so they could plan promotions.
The current summer season would be the first that buyers
were given additional budget to purchase for the eCommerce
channel. Though very little direction had been given by Joe
Miller regarding strategy, Cory Williams put pressure on the
chief merchandising officer, Sarah Thompson, to have her
teams purchase enough to have a successful season. Cory said,
“this is an opportunity to expand your selections and offer more
colors, sizes, and products, that maybe you have considered
risky before.” Sarah was also requesting forecasting models
specifically for eCommerce sales. Cory told Sarah that her team
would have to forecast based on last year’s summer eCommerce
sales, which they had access to. There was no time for the
buyers to work with the eCommerce team, so they had very
little opportunity for interaction before the new site would go
live in May.
4. CURRENT SITUATION
As the first full summer season of the integrated business model
kicked off at the end of May, executives requested daily
reporting in a dashboard (Figure 3) to quickly read facts. They
requested eCommerce specific sales data broken down by a
supplier. Executives also requested in-depth inventory analysis
with forecasting. Since the eCommerce sales could be fulfilled
from the brick-and-mortar inventory, it was important to be on
top of fluctuations in inventory and to share knowledge and
operational business results between these two channels
(inventory scorecard in Figure 3). Cory had his IT team build a
dashboard with multiple views (Inventory, Merchandising, and
Supplier) that would query and run fresh data every morning,
and a link to it was emailed to the executives.
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Figure 3. GlobePort’s Interactive Dashboard
4.1 Current Problems with the Beta Trial
Problems quickly started to mount in the midst of the busy
summer season. First, there was a big discrepancy between
what brick-and-mortar stores were carrying versus the online
platform. The marketing department would be running one
advertisement in print and the creative marketing department
another online (merchandising scorecard in Figure 3). The
content team, which was responsible for data integrity, had
product descriptions and pricing incorrect on items causing
major suppliers to get upset and claim that GlobePort had
violated contract agreements. Employees and customers started
to report issues with the product being shown on the website,
stating it was available in-store, but the item was not carried in
“that” store.
Williams became worried that these platform problems
were symptoms of modularity issues in their server-less
architecture. Cory started scrolling through items on the website
and noticed that all items said available in-store, but that was
not really possible and indicated that the development team
definitely had missed business requirements. After reviewing

dashboard results, executives commented that eCommerce
sales were being fulfilled from brick-and-mortar stores, but
store inventory was not declining as expected. The inventory
management team also started to describe discrepancies in sales
and inventory. When online sales were fulfilled from a store
location, it was not being taken out of the store’s inventory.
Executives also noticed some key suppliers missing from
the supplier scorecards (Figure 3). The eCommerce team was
still working with the model of two big, isolated channels of
business instead of the omni-channel supply chain model that
GlobePort’s board of directors, Joe Miller, and Cory Williams
were trying to achieve. Williams met with the leaders of his
eCommerce and IT team and realized a huge problem. The
eCommerce development project team had failed in involving
the content team in much-needed discussions and meetings.
They had not fully integrated the inventory databases, partly
because they never met with that team. Cory put his IT team
into crisis mode, but they told him it would take several months
to fix all the system issues.
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4.2 eCommerce Development Methodology
GlobePort’s business partners, suppliers, and the store
management teams were frustrated with the delays in
implementing the promised API, without which they could not
deploy the live solutions that they had created in-house and tap
into online activity of existing and potential customers. The
same suppliers and product designers had already adopted
DevOp’s methodology (CI/CD) that allowed them to release
code continuously (O’Connor, Elger, and Clarke, 2017). While
other large, omni-channel retailers could integrate code changes
instantaneously, GlobePort was still running longer code update
cycles frustrating GlobePort’s business partners.
Cory questioned the development methodology and change
management approach that his IT development team had
adopted. “Our response to market changes needs to be in days
not months by involving our business partners early and
continuously. We have to migrate our monolithic logic into
small and focused micro-services that can be easily updated.”
In addition to the technology architecture selection in a
transformation project, the organizational dimensions are also
very important for capturing the complexity of large
eCommerce systems implementations which represent a
complex third order change (O’Hara, Watson, and Kavan,
1999; Nguyen and Mutum, 2012). Enterprise wide system
implementations incorporate the most disruptive behaviors to
affect a company’s structure. GlobePort’s newer cloud-based
platform is a server-less architecture that allows the integration
of third party and business partner applications that can both
feed in data as well as read and process collected and stored
data from GlobePort’s internal databases. This calls for a
strategic business change and new data policies along with
knowledge management practices.
When companies need to adopt new mission-critical
enterprise systems like eCommerce and enterprise
management, they need to identify and speak with numerous
stakeholders to determine what can and cannot be done within
the established systems implementation plan (Wagner and
Piccoli, 2007; Pozza, Goetz, and Sahut, 2018). Stakeholders
needed to come up with ideas about what options they need in
the enterprise system to be able to accomplish their plans and
business processes. The implementation team needs to figure
out how best to manage these stakeholder’s needs and deploy
and implement the IT architecture that supports them. Joe
Miller asked Cory Williams, “who was responsible for bringing
all the stakeholders onboard the new eCommerce platform?”
and got no answer. GlobePort also had not rolled out training to
brick-and-mortar store personnel on the new systems to bring
their business partners fully onboard for their beta trial in May.

knowledge from multiple stakeholders and departments to run
effectively. Extensive tacit knowledge needs to be utilized in
the case of complex, multi-channel (internet and brick-andmortar) sales and marketing processes such as what GlobePort
corporate needed to operationalize in their eCommerce
transformation project. Knowledge sharing needs to be
established by GlobePort for several situations, such as: (1)
addressing unexpected situations when codified explicit
knowledge (in the IT system) does not exist to handle an
emergent business operational issue and (2) learning to
understand the complexity and interdependency of various
market scenarios – i.e., becoming fully mindful of the
undocumented “ripple effect” of various marketing offers and
nuances of each product’s features/capabilities. As Sarah
became aware of the difficulties, she stated:
Our business goals were to improve the experience of
our customers, while at the same time improve our
profitability for our product lines. In our dynamic,
multi-channel environment, new market developments
occurred constantly. It is impossible to get that
knowledge to all the stakeholders through the
eCommerce system or any of our current enterprise
systems.
6. OPTIONS TO PURSUE
After the summer season’s difficulties, board members started
to question Joe Miller about the lack of results. Joe also doubted
the board’s decision to bring their eCommerce platform inhouse, “this was a bad idea as we are not in the technology
business but rather in the sporting goods business.” He had to
pay money to break their outsourcing contract and now their
new IT systems have put the company in a worse situation. In
addition, GlobePort is now faced with several difficult
scenarios. Revenues are also quietly diminishing and
competition is increasing.
GlobePort’s business strategy remains sound and Joe Miller
stated:
We are not going to lower our profits for a short-term
gain by selling our items at a discounted price. Our
biggest revenue generator is still the brick-and-mortar
presence we have. We are not getting as many orders
because we are not the lowest priced provider. As many
customers as we lose, we actually get back more,
because the other companies do not provide the same
quality of customer service. But there is always going
to be those consumers that will buy from a competitor
because of a lower price. Those consumers need to look
out for their own best interests. Once a problem occurs,
those same consumers return, because they understand
the value that we provide.

5. OTHER TRANSFORMATION CHALLENGES
When strategic systems (such as sales/inventory or
eCommerce) supporting core processes are outsourced to a
vendor and later brought back in-house, complex and
customized knowledge management systems need to be
deployed across the business to quickly re-establish and support
those processes (Carmel and Agarwal, 2002). While
modularized tools and procedures can easily support non-core
processes, such as human resources or benefits management
(Lacity and Willcocks, 1998), supporting core processes often
requires differentiated procedures and the integration of tacit

There are options to increase these lost sales. One way was
to integrate local presence into the global eCommerce system
along with changes to business processes to integrate
knowledge in a timely fashion. A knowledge sharing system
(KMS) is the basis for competitive advantage under dynamic
market conditions (Grant, 1996). While the decision to end the
eCommerce outsourcing contract was already made, several
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other issues loomed large for Joe Miller. “How does GlobePort
succeed and thrive without discounting their inventory and
undercutting their own profits?” Integration of knowledge,
processes, and technologies is going to be needed from multiple
stakeholders very quickly to keep the company growing in this
dynamic marketplace. Joe is going to be tested on what his
company’s software team is capable of delivering and how he
can address the challenging management issues that they
currently face (Comuzzi and Parhizkar, 2017).
7. CASE STUDY QUESTIONS
After analyzing the situation posed in the case study, answer the
following questions:
1. Create a SWOT and/or SOAR Analysis for GlobePort’s
business situation.
2. Reflect on Joe Miller’s insistence on not being the
“low-cost” provider. Is it possible to achieve this using
electronic marketplaces such as eBay or Amazon?
3. What business and IT strategies are necessary in
response to the SWOT/SOAR analysis?
4. Research and recommend an IT Architectural platform
to support GlobePort’s business transformation project.
5. Did GlobePort need a knowledge management
strategy? How should customer data have played into
their transformation project?
6. Cory Williams expanded the IT department to support
the technology transformation project. What other
suggestions regarding IT project methodology and IT
development processes would you recommend?
7. Develop a feasibility analysis of GlobePort’s
eCommerce transformation project using economic,
organizational, operational, and technological factors.
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